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THE BEHAVIOR OF INVESTMENT
COMMITMENTS AND EXPENDITURES9
INDICATORSAND STAGES OF
INVESTMENT IN PLANT AND
EQUIPMENT
Introduction: Some Important Aspects of the
Investment Process
The process of capital formation in durable producer goods Consists
of two sets of lagged reactions: (1) Investment decisions respond, pre-
sumably with varying delays, to changes in a number of determining
factors. (2) The implementation of these decisions requires time, hence
expenditures lag appropriations, contracts, etc.
The lags in the implementation of investment decisions (2) are in a
sense more tangible than the lags in the formation of decisions (1), and
probably easier to establish. It is necessary to draw a clear distinction
between the two lagged relations, both of which are of major impor-
tance in the analysis of the investment process and in theories of busi-
ness cycles and the effects of stabilization policies.
Plant and equipment is a generic term denoting a vast variety of capi-
tal goods needed to satisfy the demand for capital services. The invest-
ment process is set in motion as this demand changes and the need to
acquire the capital goods is recognized. The initial stages of technical
and economic planning and cost estimation may be long and important,
but they apparently are not directly represented in the data available
for measuring aspects of the investment process. In time, the decision
to invest becomes firmer, with respect to both the details of the project
and the time it is to be initiated; and funds to finance it are budgeted,
appropriated, and contractually committed. These latter stages can be412The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
measured by the current aggregative series on capital appropriations
and investment orders and contracts.
It is at this point that orders data may find their first application to
investment analysis. As the orders for equipment and contracts for
plant are filled, payments are made on their account. Meanwhile, the
capital goods, which are to be the end product of the process, as far
as their sellers are concerned, assume their material form and economic
function. That is, they are produced, built, shipped, and installed—in
short, acquired in some way to render services to the user.
The demand for capital services is a function of the demand for the
output which these services help to produce. The demand for outputs
of manufacturing industries is measured by manufacturers' orders.
This is the second point at which orders data appear as potentially use-
ful for investment analysis. The two applications are certainly different
in concept and in their data requirements.
On the Role and Timing of Investment Decisions
The view that investment expenditures play a central role in busi-
ness cycles is an old one, held by many economists. Its main sources
are the following notions or observations: (1) that these expenditures
are neither constrained nor required by prior receipts, and are not
closely related to the latter; (2) that they fluctuate during business cy-
cles with wider relative amplitudes than other major expenditure cat-
egories; (3) that they lag, often by long intervals, the decisions to in-
vest; and (4) that the investment decisions themselves have a cyclical
pattern and a tendency to lead at peaks and troughs in aggregate eco-
nomic activity.
Point (1) has been particularly emphasized in those Keynesian mod-
els where investment is treated as an important category of "autono-
mous" expenditures that set in motion the multiplier process; but it is
also found, mutatis mutandis, in some older theories in which much
weight is attached to investment. The other points concern empirical
observations: (2) can be said to have long been well established; (3) is
plausible enough and was often assumed, but the relevant measure-
ments have until recently been few and quite crude—which is not sur-
prising, as it is not easy to measure investment "decisions"; and (4) is
even more difficult to establish for the same reason, and is much more
in need of being documented since it is far from obvious.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment413
A cyclical model of the economy can be constructed on the basis of
(1), (3), and (4); (2) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
here. However, positing (1), interpreted to mean that investment is in-
dependent of income, cannot be simply taken for granted. It is a hy-
pothesis which, far from being established empirically, is widely viewed
as dubious and unsatisfactory. The situation for (3) and (4) is very dif-
ferent: There is already much evidence to validate and quantify these
statements, owing largely to recent gains in assembling data that reflect
investment decisions, such as orders and appropriations.
The existence of (4) is particularly important because it appears to
be a necessary condition for the validity of any hypothesis that ascribes
to investment the prime causal role in business cycles. It is difficult to
see how any hypothesis in this class could be successfully defended if
the decisions to invest and the resulting commitments did not tend to
move ahead of aggregate production and income. Expenditures on plant
and equipment actually lag at business cycle turns, which was deemed
by some to be the major argument against the investment hypothesis
of the cycle. But this is not convincing, since it ignores the possibility
that investment commitments may lead and have important influences
of their own.
In fact, the early cyclical timing of commitments can be well doc-
umented, as will be shown in this chapter. But it must be recognized
that acceptance of both (3) and (4) is still nor sufficient for a demon-
stration that investment is indeed the prime mover in major fluctuations
of the economy. As elsewhere, one must guard here against the post
hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy. Even if the amounts of investment de-
cided upon begin to swell and shrink ahead of the troughs and peaks
of the economy at large, this does not necessarily mean that these early
changes in investment commitments are "the cause" and the later
changes in general business activity "the effect." Investment decisions
are necessarily the antecedent and can be treated as the proximate
"cause" of investment spending [as stated in (3)]. There are also fur-
ther propagation effects to the extent that increases in this spending
stimulate and decreases discourage other types of expenditure. But
it is conceivable that other factors, more "autonomous" than invest-
ment, determine first the investment decisions and then spending.t
'Cf. Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, and BusinessCycles," of Eco-
iioinics and Siatisilcs. Supplement, February 1963, p. 48, n. 21.414The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
IssuesRelatingto the Cyclical Behavior of Investment
The lag of investment expenditures behind investment decisions is
an essential element in several otherwise quite different theories of
business cycles. Consider the hypothesis that downturns of investment
are attributable to the stresses of advanced expansion in aggregate in-
come and output. It could be used to explain why investment decisions
(or commitments) begin to decline. But investment expenditures can
hardly be assumed to decline simultaneously in a degree sufficient to
bring about a general business downturn, for this would at once cut
off the rise in income, whereas income must be permitted to rise if the
changes that are unfavorable to investment are to develop. Introduc-
tion of an expenditure lag removes this logical difficulty by reminding
us that investment undertakings can already be declining while invest-
ment expenditures and income are still rising. The undertakings deter-
mine future spending on investment, but current income is associated
with current spending. Thus it can be argued that the lag in the execu-
tion of investment projects (contracts or orders) plays a critical role
in explaining business cycle reversals in theories that link investment
decisions to elements of current and recent incomes and their distri-
bution.
An argument along the above lines was made by Milton Friedman
in his interpretation of Wesley Mitchell's view of the investment pro-
cess and its role in business cycles.2 To recall its salient points, Mit-
chell's analysis (first developed in his 1913 Business Cycles) relates
investment decisions to profits expectations and the latter to current
profits and their distribution. As a business expansion unfolds, aggre-
gate income rises and so do both the volume of sales and average profit
margins; hence, total profits must increase. Later in the expansion,
however, profit margins begin to decline because of rising cost sched-
ules and the tendency for many buying prices to increase faster than
selling prices. When the decline in margins eventually outweighs the
continuing increase in sales, total profits turn down. These develop-
ments influence strongly the timing of decisions to implement invest-
ment projects. New investment commitments begin to decline, which
is an early factor of great importance in the process leading to the gen-
2MiltonFriedman, "Wesley C. Mitchell as an Economic Theorist ,"Journal of Political Economy,
December1950;reprinted in Arthur F. Burns, ed., Wesley Clair Mitchell, The EconomicScientist,
NewYork, NBER, 1952; see in particular pp. 263—66.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 415
era! business downturn. Investment expenditures, on the other hand,
lag in this process, reflecting the long periods of time that are required
for completion of many undertakings to build and equip productive
plant.
An early appearance of the distinction between orders and deliveries
of capital goods marks a business cycle model by Kalecki (1933). In
this system, deliveries lag behind orders for capital goods by a given
"gestation period," 0. Gross saving or "accumulation" equals pro-
duction of capital goods, which proceeds at a rate measured by the
average volume of unfilled investment orders over the interval 0. Net
investment, or the change in capital stock, equals capital goods de-
liveries minus depreciation of capital equipment due to wear and tear
and obsolescence. The ratio of new investment orders to capital stock
is a function of the rate of profit, and real gross profit itself is related
to gross accumulation. The model implies that new investment orders
are an increasing function of capital goods production and a decreasing
function of the existing capital stock. It produces a cyclical movement
by letting the capital stock itself fluctuate, that is, capital goods deliv-
eries periodically fall short of replacement requirements.3
In models based on the interaction of savings and investment func-
tions, fluctuations can come about by assumption either of certain time-
or both. In his 1940 model, Nicholas
Kaldor employs nonlinear functions and deliberately abstracts from
lags.4
The familiar business cycle model of J. R. Hicks (1950) represents
a theory which employs both lags and nonlinearities. For investment
in plant and equipment, Hicks suspends the accelerator over a part of
the cycle (because of surplus capacity), making it operative only in the
later stages of expansion and at the beginning of the contraction. Dis-
3M. Kalecki, "A Macrodynamic Theory of Business Cycles," Econoinetrica,1935, pp. 327—44
(paperpresentedin 1933). This business cycle model underwent severalchanges inKalecki's later
works,but the feature of the orders-delivery lag for capital goods has been retained throughout this
development. Given the structural coefficients of these models, the length of that lag determines the
duration of the implicit cycles and whether or not they are damped (in the absence of erratic shocks).
4N. Kaldor, "A Model of the Trade Cycle," EconomicJournal,March 1940, pp. 78—92. Kaldor
regards it as a virtue of his model that it does not depend on particular parameters, lags, or initial
"shocks." But a theory of business cycles may also suffer from being overly self-contained (endog-
enous) and too dependent on particular nonlinearities. The virtual disregard of lags can hardly be
a merit if the theory is to retain contact with fluctuations in the real world, which surely include cer-
tain lags as one of their foremost features. And it is not established at all that lags shouldbeimpor-
tant only "in determining the periodofthe cycle" and have no part "in explaining its existence"
(ibid.,p. 92).416The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
tributed lags are worked into the consumption function and are also
included, somewhat cursorily, in the discussion of induced investment.
The main effect of replacing a simple discrete lag by a longer lag, which
spreads the response of investment to changes in output over several
periods, is to prolong the expansion (for any given combination of val-
ues for the coefficients of the consumption and induced investment
functions).5
Whether simple or distributed, the lags are assumed to remain un-
changed over the cycle, as are the coefficients of the system. Yet in
the case of the fixed investment function, one can expect the lags to
increase late in expansion, when, due to the strain on capacities of
capital goods producers, more time is likely to be required, on the aver-
age, for investment contracts to materialize in deliveries and installa-
tions. Such a development would be accompanied in part by price in-
creases and in part by unfilled orders accumulations, which may tem-
porarily provide some further stimulation of investment demand. It
seems improbable that the latter would then be kept in check by the
current and recent increases in output or for that matter that it would
bear any fixed relation to these increases.
The extension of the lag, however, may tend to prolong the expansion
(in analogy to Hicks's comparison of simple and distributed lags). The
resulting increase in the orders backlog may also tend to make the
downturn more gradual and the early stages of contraction less
for old unfilled contracts can provide a reserve of work to be carried
out long alter new investment has been curtailed.6 Gestation periods
for various types of investment projects vary widely. Also, the peaks
of orders for different categories of capital goods usually fall on dates
that are scattered over a substantial period rather than being heavily
concentrated at one time. These facts make for a less sharp decline in
aggregate investment orders and for a more gradual and lagged decline
5J.R.Hicks, AContribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle, Oxford, England, 1950, pp.
113—15.
6On the otherhand,depletion of the backlog may worsen the economic situation in the midst of
a downswing. Expenditures on, and presumably also completions of, investment projects tend to
reach their peaks when a business decline is already in progress. Burns draws attention to a sug-
gestive fact when he notes that "it appears that the crop of newly completed factories reaches its
maximum when contraction is well under way—or just in time to intensify the competitive struggle
then in progress." Cf. Arthur F. "Economic Research and the Keynesian Thinking of Our
Times," Twenty-Sixth AnnualReportof the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York,
June 1946; reprinted in Burns, The Frontiers of Economic Knowledge, New York, NBER, 1954;
see p. 23.C,
Indicatorsand Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 417
in investment expenditure than could be hypothesized in disregard of
them. They create a presumption against the concept of abrupt down-
turns in general economic activity being caused by a recurring collapse
of confidence in the profitability of investment undertakings and a con-
sequent collapse of "aggregate investment" as such.7
It is indeed likely that the demand for new plant and equipment will
weaken and eventually fall off when capacity increases begin to over-
take output increases, or when most firms come to hold the expecta-
tion that this is imminent. But the concepts involved are extremely dif-
ficult to handle. Short-term changes in the demand for its products
currently appear to a firm as erratic in a large degree. It is not easy to
distinguish with sufficient confidence a change that is just transitory
from one that is more lasting and less risky to use for extrapolation.
Measurement of existing capacities is difficult, and estimation of re-
quired capacities even more so. The analyst also faces formidable prob-
lems of aggregation.
As shown by this brief and selective survey, important issues in busi-
ness cycle analysis relate to the internal lag structure and the cyclical
timing of investment stages. These matters require much further study
before the lagged relations involved can be adequately specified, es-
timated, and tested. This chapter and the next will report merely on
a few small steps in this direction.
Investment Plans, Commitments, and Outlays
New Orders for Producer Equipment and Construction
Contracts for Plant
The aggregate of new orders received by durable goods manufac-
turers contains not only some that correspond to the "equipment"
component of business fixed investment outlays, but also a large va-
riety of other kinds. These include orders placed by domestic inter-
mediate (nonfinal) users for resale purposes, those placed by foreign-
ers, and those placed by the government.8
This idea, foundin many recent writings, goes back to Keynes and his, certainly understandable,
preoccupationwith the rapid business contraction of the early 1930's. Cf. Burns, Frontiers, pp.
18—19.
8 All orders for consumer durable goods must, of course, be excluded in deriving the business in-
vestment order series. But these would typically be "resale" orders, received from the trade sectors,
as consumers do not ordinarily place direct orders with manufacturers.418The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
The breakdown by major industries used in the published Commerce
figures on new orders permits only a very crude approximation to what
is needed here: a series on commitments for the purchase of equipment
by business enterprise. However, much better estimates of new orders
for industrial and other productive equipment were made available in
1961 by the Department of Commerce on the basis of a more detailed
classification of their orders data.9
The series of new orders for machinery and equipment in its present
form includes new orders received by the following thirteen durable
goods industries: steam engines and turbines; internal combustion en-
gines; construction, mining, and materials-handling machinery; metal-
working machinery; miscellaneous equipment;specialindustrial
machinery; general industrial machinery; office and store machines;
service industry machinery; electrical transmission, distribution equip-
ment; electrical industrial apparatus; other electrical machinery; and
shipbuilding and railroad equipment. Orders for other industries do
not, for the most part, represent business purchases of equipment. The
exclusion of these industries, however, does mean omitting such im-
portant items as trucks and commercial aircraft.1° On the other hand,
inclusion of all orders received by the machinery and equipment in-
dustries results in overstatement, since some of these orders are placed
by government and foreign buyers.
The information needed to correct for these elements of under- and
overestimation is essentially lacking because the statistics are reported
by the receiving industry rather than by product and user categories.
Also, like the output of multiproduct companies that are included in
an industry according to the definition of their main productive activity,
orders received by an industry are highly diversified. However, a sig-
nificant improvement in the latter respect has probably resulted from
°Theseestimates were introduced in Victor Zarnowitz, "The Timing of Manufacturers' Orders
During Business Cycles," in Geoffrey H. Moore, ed., BusinessCycle Indicators, Princetonfor
NBER, 1961, Vol. 1, pp. 475if.The data were published in ibid.,Vol.II, series 6.1, p. 90. Since
autumn 1961, the monthly figures have been reported regularly in U.S. Department of Commerce,
BusinessCycle Developments, asseries 24, "Value of manufacturers' new orders, machinery and
equipment industries." Since December 1963, this series has been published in revised form to
reflect the 1963 revision of the Industry Survey data and to exclude fabricated metal products.
10Mostof the output of the motor vehicle industry consists of consumer durables (civilian pas-
senger automobiles). Military purchases are also important here, but even more so in the nonauto-
motive transportation equipment industry, particularly aircraft. This explains the decision to omit
these industries from the aggregate of private orders for capital equipment.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 419
the 1963 revision that put the data on a divisional instead of company
basis (see the description of the current Census data at the beginning
of Chapter 3, above).
Before 1963, the series of new orders for machinery and equipment
included fabricated metal products. The selection of this industry seems
to have been largely an error, since fabricated metals represent mainly
materials to be further processed rather than capital goods bought by
first users. However, since we have used the old data in the part of the
subsequent analysis that predated the 1963 changes in the orders se-
ries, Chart 9-1 presents these data in two versions: with and without
new orders for fabricated metal products (see curves 2 and 3). The two
series run a closely similar course, although their levels differ sub-
stantially, since the fabricated metal orders add up to rather large
monthly amounts.
The "plant" component of business capital formation is not directly
represented in the new-order aggregate. The best counterpart to it
among the commitments data is the series of contracts awarded to
building contractors for industrial and commercial construction, plus
contracts for privately owned public works and public utilities, as com-
piled by the F. W. Dodge Corporation. This series is plotted as curve
4 in Chart
The aggregate of current commitments to invest in plant and equip-
ment combines series 2 and 4. Since the data on construction contracts
as well as those on new orders are in current-dollar values, the series
can be combined by simple addition. In the resulting totals, the com-
ponent categories are weighted by the transaction volumes they rep-
resent. The estimated totals of equipment orders and plant contracts
are shown as curve 1 in Chart 9-1.
The chart makes it clear that the construction contract values form
a highly volatile series with large month-to-month variations, especially
in the period before 1954. New orders are much less erratic and have
a considerably clearer cyclical pattern. It is also evident that the total
"TheDodge data cover private projects of $10,000 minimum valuation (previously, lower val-
uations were included). The data available for our purpose cover thirty-seven eastern and southern
states in 1948—56 and forty-eight states since then. They include contracts for commercial buildings
such as banks, offices, stores, garages, etc., and for manufacturing buildings (e.g., processing, me-
chanical). Adjustments for cancellations, additions, and corrections are made when ascertained. For
more detail, see the description and references in Moore, ed., Business Cycle indicators, Vol. II,
series 6.0, pp. 12—14.Cr
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Chart 9-1
Manufacturers' New Orders for Machinery and Equipment















Note: Shadedareasrepresent business contractions; unshaded artas, expansions.
Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles; circles identify minor turns and re-
tardations.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics; F. W. Dodge
Corporation.
aThisseries is the sum of series 2 and 4 in this chart.
I)Includesnew orders for fabricated metal products.
cIncludescontracts for privately owned public works and utilities.
investment orders-and-contracts series reflects the behavior of new
orders much more than contracts, because orders are a large, and con-
tracts a relatively small, component of the total.
In fact, the new-order data overstate investment in equipment and
the contracts data understate investment in plant greatly. For example,
the value of new orders received by industries producing machineryIndicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 421
and equipment averaged $52 billion (annual rate) in 1956—5 8 if fabri-
cated metal products are included, and $35 billion if they are excluded.
In the same period the producer durable equipment component of gross
national product had an average annual value of $27 billion. There is
no doubt that the new orders aggregates include products that should
be regarded as "materials" rather than "final" capital goods. Elimina-
tion of fabricated metals appears to remedy much but not all of this
overstatement. Material￿ can of course be counted repeatedly at suc-
cessive production stages. The orders figures are gross, while the in-
vestment expenditure data on the GNP basis are net, of such duplica-
tions. (The latter are presumably "gross" only in the sense of cover-
ing outlays for replacements as well as new net additions to the stock
of real capital held by business.)
For the construction contracts component of our investment com-
mitments series, the annual average value for 1956—58 was somewhat
less than $7 billion. The corresponding figure for the value of industrial
and commercial construction and other private nonfarm nonresidential
construction was somewhat more than $14 billion. In part, this large
difference in levels reflects conceptual divergencies, but it does indicate
the amount of undercoverage of construction projects in the contracts
data.12
An approximate correction for the overstatement of equipment or-
ders (EO)andunderstatement of plant contracts (PC) in the simple ag-
gregate of orders and contracts (OC) was made by constructing a re-
weighted aggregate, OCr, according to the formula OC'= (1.6/4.9)
(EO) + PC. Here new orders for producer equipment (excluding fab-
ricated metal products) are given only about one-third of their former
weight relative to plant contracts. This is done because the average
ratio for 1957—59 of producer durable equipment to nonresidential
structures was approximately 1.6, according to the national income
accounts of the Department of Commerce, while the corresponding
average ratio of equipment orders to plant contracts was about 4.9.
In Chart 9-2, the first curve shows OC and the second shows the re-
12Commercialand industrial building contracts accounted for about 78 per cent of the value of
this type of Construction completed in 1956—58; other private nonfarm nonresidential construction
contracts (of which not all are included in our series) accounted for only 42 per cent of the value put-
in-place. The proportion for both categories combined was approximately 59 per cent. (See Moore,
ed., BusinessCycle Indicajors, Vol.II, p. 14.) Before 1956, the coverage of the Dodge statistics was
considerably lower because eleven western states were excluded. It is estimated that construction
in these states amounted to 20 per cent or more of the national total in the period 1926—56.422The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
Chart 9-2
Commitments and Expenditures for Plant and Equipment,
Quarterly, 1953—65
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles; circles, minor turns and re-
tardations.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce; Securities and Exchange Commission; F. W.
Dodge Corporation.
weighted series OCr, each in quarterly, seasonally adjusted form, for
1953—65. These graphs are based on the most recent Census data on
new orders of the machinery and equipment industries and also the
latest Dodge data on commercial and industrial contracts. The relative
movements of the two series are on the whole quite similar; the effects
of the reweighting are thus fairly small. The short variations in OCT
are often a little larger than those in OC (see the curves for 1953 and
1962—64), which reflects the relatively large erratic movements in theIndicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 423
PC series, which is given greater weight in ocrthanin 0G. The cy-
clical turning points in the two series coincide, except for the peaks
in 1959—60, where OC seems to have an earlier major turn; but even
here the difference is marginal.13
Fixed-Investment Orders and Expenditures
The investment orders-and-contracts series—both the simple (OC)
and the reweighted aggregates—can be used as indicators of
business expenditures on plant and equipment. The investment com-
mitments and expenditures data are compared in quarterly form in
Chart 9-2.
The capital outlay estimates denoted as I (curve 3) are compiled by
the Office of Business Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce
(OBE), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They
are derived from reports by corporations registered with the SEC, by
unincorporated and incorporated companies reporting to the ORE, and
by a group of transportation firms under the jurisdiction of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. The total sample accounts for over 60
per cent of aggregate new investment in plant and equipment, but cov-
erage varies among the industries.14 These figures, then, reflect the
actual quarterly costs that are charged to capital accounts. Ordinarily,
depreciation accounts are maintained for such outlays. The data come
from the reports of those who, having placed the investment orders
and contracts, incur the costs as measured by the expenditure. On the
other hand, the value of investment commitments is estimated in large
part from the reports of firms in the machinery and equipment indus-
tries, i.e., those who have received the orders.
The OBE-SEC business capital outlays series (I) is not as compre-
hensive as the plant-and-equipment component of GNP (/9)(curve4
in Chart 9-2). The OBE-SEC data exclude, while the GNP data in-
clude, investment by professionals, nonprofit institutions, real estate
firms, and insurance companies; expenditures for petroleum and nat-
ural gas well drilling; and capital outlays charged to current expense
(e.g., hand tools). The average annual value of business expenditures
A double-peak configuration will be noted in eachofthe two series during this period. In OC,
the 1959 peak is a little higher than the 1960 one, while the reverse applies to OC' (see Chart 9.2).
"It is high in railroad transportation, public utilities, and some manufacturing industries, and low
in real estate and parts of the financial sector. See description and references in Moore, ed., Business
Cycleindicators, Vol. II, series 22.0, pp. 54—55.424The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
on plant and equipment in 1956—58 was $34 billion according to the
OBE-SEC estimates, but $41 billion in the GNP accounts.15 Despite
these differences in coverage between I and 1", the relative movements
in the two series resemble each other closely most of the time (the only
significant divergence shown on the chart is in the second half of 1954).
The orders-contracts figures are more nearly comparable to I than
to F',andthe OBE-SEC data will be used more intensively in the anal-
ysis to follow than the GNP data. However, only the latter provide a
division of the expenditures into those for producer durable equipment
(PDE) and those for plant or nonresidential structures (Str), which
makes it possible to set up separate investment realization functions
for the two types of capital goods. In the OBE-SEC data, outlays on
equipment and construction are not available separately.
Chart 9-2 accords with general expectations of what the relation
between investment commitments and expenditures shouLd be. The
time-path of outlays on investment goods resembles the course of new
orders and contracts for such goods, but the fluctuations in outlays
lag behind those in orders and have smaller relative amplitudes. Two-
quarter lags of expenditures are observed at the 1-1957 peaks and again
at the 1-1958 troughs of commitments (regardless of whether orders
are represented by OC or by OCr and whether expenditures are meas-
ured by I or by I"). Three-quarter lags of! are recorded at the 11-1954
trough and at the 111-1959 peak of OC.16 However, the upturns of in-
vestment orders and expenditures coincide in the second quarter of
1961.
Chart 9-3 demonstrates a very similar relationship between the equip-
ment components of fixed-investment commitments and outlays. In the
period from 1-1953 to 11-1954, new orders for machinery and equip-
ment (EO) declined strongly, while the PDE expenditures rose alittle
in the first two quarters of this interval and decreased gently in the
next three. Then EO turned up sharply between 11-1954 and 1-1955,
while PDE barely increased, describing a "flat-bottom" movement that
'5Thisis approximately the sum of $27 billion of producer durable equipment and $14 billion of
private nonresidential nonfarm construction. (Of course, this aggregate, like that for business cap-
ital outlays compiled by the OBE-SEC, excludes expenditures by farmers and on all residential
housing.)
"The 1954 trough in inthe second quarter, just like the troughs in OC and but ac-
tually I" did not start rising significantly until after 1-1955, i.e., three quarters later (see the text be-
low about the underlying behavior of expenditures on producer durable equipment). The use of the
late peak of OCr in 1960 could also lead to a misleading timing comparison (see note 13, above).Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment425
Chart9-3
Commitments and Expenditures for Producers' Durable Equipment
and for Structures, Quarterly, 1953—65
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles; circles, minor turns and re-
tardations.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce; F. W. Dodge Corporation.
only in 1955 ended in a decisive upswing. Thus, although the troughs
or lowest standings of the two series technically coincide in 11-1954,
the actual recovery of PDE lagged behind the upturn in EQ by three
quarters. At the peaks of 1956—57 and 1959—60, two lags of PDE rel-
ative to EQ of three quarters each are clearly seen on the chart. The
1958 troughs are separated by a two-quarter lag. Again, only the II-
1961 troughs appear to be really coincident.
Contracts for commercial and industrial plant construction (PC) and
outlays for the nonresidential structures component of fixed invest-
'62'63'64426The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
ment (Str) differ much more. PC shows large erratic variations, but
Str follows a generally quite smooth course (Chart 9-3). The erratic
appearance of PC is no doubt in considerable measure due to the lim-
ited sample coverage of this series, but a marked differentiation of this
sort between commitments and realizations would be expected in this
.area and is believed to represent a real and basic phenomenon. Struc-
tures presumably require substantially longer gestation or "delivery"
periods than does equipment; hence there is more room here for sta-
bilization of the flow of funds spent relative to the flow of funds com-
mitted —whichreflects the stabilization of production relative to de-
mand.
As a result, the two series for investment in plant show particularly
sharp contrasts on several occasions. Thus in 1954 PC first declined
steeply and then rose substantially, while Str merely flattened off. In
1960—61, Str responded similarly, with a prolonged sideward move-
ment, to a marked contraction and recovery in PC. In 1963—65, short
up-and-down movements in PC were transformed into a smooth up-
ward drift in Sir. Such strong smoothing suppresses turning points,
and thus few direct timing, comparisons can be made, but the estimates
leave little doubt about the pronounced tendency of expenditures for
plant construction to lag behind contracts. These retardations in Str
lag behind the contractions in PC by intervals of one to two quarters.
Longer lags—six quarters at the 1956—57 peaks and four quarters at
the 1958—59 troughs in the two series—can also be observed, although
there is some uncertainty about these observations because of double-
turn configurations in PC.'7
Older data covering the earlier postwar years show the same type
of relationship between new investment orders and contracts and busi-
ness expenditures on plant and equipment. Curve 1 from Chart 9-1 is
reproduced in quarterly form in Chart 9-4 (the OBE-Dodge series in-
cluding fabricated metals orders). With it are shown the OBE-SEC se-
ries for fixed-investment outlays of all industries and all manufactur-
ing, 1948—61 (curves 3 and 4). Again, it is evident that the cyclical
movements in outlays follow with substantial lags and smaller relative
amplitudes the corresponding fluctuations in new orders. The one con-
'7Thus, when measured from the secondarypeak ofPC in 1-1957, the lag of Siristwo quarters,
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Note:Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify specific peaks and troughs of specific cycles.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics; Securities
and Exchange Commission; F. W. Dodge Corporation; National Industrial Conference
Board.
aNetof cancellations. Computed by addition of series for component industries,
seasonally adjusted by NBER. The gross appropriations figures, seasonally adjusted by
NICB, are shown as points lying above the net appropriations curve. (The encircled
points represent the specific-cycle turns in the gross appropriations series.)
bThesolid curve shows actual expenditures. The points linked with the curve are
"first anticipations" of the expenditures converted to the present levels. They are
obtained by taking the first anticipated changes (A1 —A2)and adding these changes, ob-
serving signs, to the present levels. The links connect actual expenditures of any given
quarter with the anticipated expenditures of the next quarter; the former is the quarter
in which the projection was made; the latter is the quarter to which the projected figure
refers. The anticipations data are seasonally adjusted by the source since 1953; for
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spicuous difference between these series is that the short but pro-
nounced "Korean" cycle in investment orders, with a high peak in the
first quarter of 1951, is largely smoothed out in the series on expend-
itures for plant and equipment (as it is in the corresponding production
and shipments series).
On five occasions, two-quarter lags of business capital outlays are
recorded at cyclical turns of new investment orders in Chart 9-4 (com-
pare curves 1 and 3). At the 1954 trough, the lag is four quarters, and
at the 1951 peak it is as long as ten quarters. That peak, of course,
was associated with the heavy accumulation of unfilled order backlogs
during the first year of the Korean War. The average lag of outlays in
the period since 1949 turns out to be 10.3 months according to these
data. For the period since 1954, it is 7.2 months, similar to the average
lag of 6 months obtained by using the new data from Chart 9-2.
To conclude, it is reassuring to find that the main results of the anal-
ysis in this section show a certain degree of robustness in that they do
not depend critically on which of the different sets of data for fixed-in-
vestment orders and expenditures are used.
Capital Appropriations, Commitments, and Spending
Chart 9-4 includes quarterly series on new capital appropriations
and capital expenditures of several hundred large manufacturing com-
panies reporting to the National Industrial Conference Board.'8 An
"approved capital appropriation" is an authorization by top manage-
ment (typically the board of directors or president) of a future capital
expenditure. Appropriations cover new plants and buildings, additions
to or improvements of plants and buildings, new machinery, office ma-
chines, storage equipment, and motor vehicles for business use. Ex-
'8Thenumber of reporting companies has increased over time. Data for 1953—54 from a 353-
company subsamplewere linked to the 1955—58 datafrom a 507-company subsample; the latter
again were linked to the 1958—60 data for the currently responding 602-company sample. The se-
ries have recently been adjusted for seasonal variation. (The NICB publishes the figures in unad-
justed form in the Conference Board Business Record but provides the user with some charts of the
adjusted series.) In addition to Statistics of newly approved capital appropriations, cancellations,
and expenditures, the NICB compiles data on volume ("backlog") of appropriations outstanding,
amounts committed and spent, and the percentage of companies reporting increases in appropria-
tions. All these measures are based on a continuing quarterly survey among the nation's largest
manufacturing companies. For a description of statistical procedures, the survey coverage, and
limitations of the data, see Conference Board Business Record, October 1956 and July 1960; and
Morris Cohen, "The National Industrial Conference Board Survey of Capital Appropriations," in
The Quality and Economic Significance ofAai'icipations Data, Universities—National Bureau Con-
ference 10, Princeton for NBER, 1960.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment429
cluded are funds earmarked for land purchase, maintenance and repair,
acquisition of existing companies, used equipment and buildings, and
capital spending outside the United States.
The approval of a capital appropriation confirms or changes the an-
nual capital budget of the company. In setting up the budget, the first
stage is to complete the process of planning and executing capital out-
lays; the second stage is the appropriations procedure in which the
budget is disaggregated and "tested" by individual projects.'9 The
third stage, logically, would be the commitment of the money, i.e.,
placing of the order or contract for equipment or plant. Actual outlays
may begin as construction work takes place and machinery and equip-
ment are produced, shipped, and installed. In the last stage the pay-
ment for the capital goods acquired is completed and the expenditure
is recorded.
In this sequence, appropriations lead commitments (investment or-
ders). In fact, for those companies in the NICB sample which report
commitments as distinguished from expenditures, commitments of ap-
propriated funds do show some lag vis-à-vis the approvals of such
funds, though the lag appears to be relatively short and irregular.2° The
amplitudes of appropriations exceed those of commitments. These ob-
servations, however, are highly tentative as they are based on slender
evidence. Only about 35percent of the companies in the NICB sample
are able to report their commitments.2'
New authorizations made during a quarter add to the backlog of ap-
propriations outstanding at the beginning of the quarter; commitment
or spending, as well as cancellation, of the appropriations reduce the
backlog. Hence the change in the appropriations backlog during a given
quarter equals the difference between new approvals and the sum of
the appropriations committed, spent, or cancelled. For the companies
unable to report commitments —themajority of the sample —outstand-
ing appropriations are taken to expire only when spent or cancelled.
The fact that the appropriation backlog series is largely on an expended
rather than "committed" basis makes it less forward looking than it
Cohen, "Capital Appropriations," p. 300.
for 117 durable goods manufacturers, a downturn in appropriations occurred in 1V-1955
and a downturn in commitments in 11-1956; but both series moved briefly down together in 111-1956,
whereupon commitments reached a secondary peak in IV.1956 and appropriations in 1-1957. In
1958, both appropriations and commitments turned up together in the third quarter. See Conference
Board Business Record, July 1960, P. 7.
Cohen, "Capital Appropriations," p. 307.430The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
would be otherwise. Since the placement of orders precedes spending,
uncommitted appropriations backlogs should be an earlier anticipatory
series than the unexpended backlogs.22
For comparisons with orders and expenditures, appropriations are
best taken net of cancellations. The latter, however, are apparently not
large enough to create major discrepancies between the time-paths of
gross and net appropriations; the two series tend to move closely to-
gether and turn at the same time, as shown in Chart
Relatingthe Aggregative Data on Investment Stages
Even if manufacturers' new capital appropriations (App) should lead
investment orders placed by the same companies, they need not lead
our investment orders-contracts series (OC), which has a different and
broader scope. The investment orders are reported by the firms that
receive them; the appropriations, by those that place the orders. The
former data relate to orders to be processed by manufacturers and to
contracts for plant construction to be put in place by builders. These
orders and contracts originate in many sectors of the U.S. economy
as well as abroad; but appropriations all originate with large domestic
manufacturing corporations.24
Nevertheless, it would not be implausible if appropriations actually
did have a definite tendency to lead new orders for capital goods. It
cannot be firmly established that this is actually so, since the timing
of these series appears to have been more nearly coincident on a few
occasions, notably at troughs in 1954, 1958, and 1967; but on the aver-
age a short lag of orders is indicated, at least at the peaks. At the height
22LetB1be the appropriations backlog at the end of the quarter; A?, gross new appropriations;
C1, cancellations; — netnew appropriations; 07,capitalcommitments for those com-
panies that report them; E7,capitalexpenditures for the other companies; E1= 07 + E7, appro-
priations committed or spent. (All these variables, except B,whichis a stock, are flows during the
quarter.) Then, B1_1+ A7— C1 — 07— E7 = B1 orB1— B1_1 = M' — E1.
Forthose companies which report appropriations on a commitment basis, B1representscapital
appropriations outstanding that have yet to be committed, i.e., the backlog of capital goods orders
yet to be placed. This should be a foreshadowing series for unfilled orders recorded by the receiving
companies in the capital-goods-producing industries: However, for all those firms that do not report
commitments, outstanding totals of appropriations represent unexpended, rather than uncommitted,
backlogs. Here the orders may have been placed earlier; all that the totals tell us is that a certain
sum of money is yet to be spent. It is important to note that this distinction applies to the meaning
of the appropriations backlogs, not to the newly approved appropriations which, unless cancelled,
do represent investment orders to be placed. See ConferenceBoard Business Record,October 1956,
p.425.
23Cancellationsdid increase in the vicinity of troughs in appropriations, particularly in 1958 and
less so in 1954. Compare gross and net appropriations in Chart 9-4.
24Recently,the NICB has also begun reporting appropriation figures for electrical and gas utilities.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 431
of the investment boom of the mid-1950's, appropriations did in fact
lead orders by a long interval (compare curves 1 and 2 in Chart 9-4).
For the 1959 peaks, the comparison is somewhat inconclusive, de-
pending as it does on which of the orders-contracts series is used (com-
pare the OC curves in Charts 9-2 and 9-4), but the best indication is
one of roughly coincident timing. However, it is particularly notable
here that OC declined initially very little in 1960, lingering at high
levels well after App dropped off sharply. In l966,App reached a peak
in the second quarter, OC in September (or third quarter); and most
recently App had its highest value in the third quarter of 1969, OC in
January 1970.25
Manufacturers' appropriations have considerably larger percentage
amplitudes of cyclical movement than the total investment orders (com-
pare curves 1 and 2 in Chart 9-4). Similarly, the NICB capital outlays
of manufacturers move in larger cycles, measured in percentages, than
do total business expenditures on plant and equipment (cf. curves 3
and 5). These results may in part be due to technical reasons such as
differences in sample size, but they also reflect the fact that investment
by manufacturers is more cyclical than investment by nonmanufactur-
ing business—perhaps because of the greater cyclical sensitivity of
manufacturing output compared with that of other sectors of the econ-
omy. Evidence of that behavior is provided by the OBE-SEC series
on plant and equipment expenditures, which show larger relative fluc-
tuations for manufacturers alone than for business as a whole (cf.
curves 3 and 4). The NICB capital outlays series resembles the OBE-
SEC figures for manufacturing rather well, those for all business ap-
preciably less (cf. curve 5 with curves 3 and 4).
New capital appropriations very definitely lead plant and equipment
expenditures, not only as estimated by the NICB for the same sample
of large manufacturers, but also total business and the total manufac-
turing outlays on fixed investment as estimated by OBE-SEC (see
Chart 9-4). These are all leads of either 2 or 3 quarters, except for a
few longer leads (4—7 quarters) that are associated mainly with the
IV-1955 peak in appropriations. On the average, expenditures lagged
appropriations by 10 to 11 months at the five turning points of tLe
See charts and figures in the latest issue of theBusiness Conditions Digest (BCD) available at
thetime of this writing: theApril1970 issue, pp. 23—24 and 72, series 10 and II.(My charts were
prepared muchearlierand have not been updated.)432The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
1954—60 period. This may be compared with average lags of 6 to 8
months obtained by comparing the corresponding turns in expenditures
and new investment orders. There is no indication of a systematic dif-
ference in timing between the different capital expenditure series com-
pared here.
As would be expected, the association between the two NICB se-
ries is much closer than that between manufacturers' appropriations
and the comprehensive investment outlays. The latter bear more re-
semblance to new investment orders than to the appropriations series,
allowing for the lags. This is suggested by graphical comparison (see
Chart 9-4) and confirmed by Table 9-i, which shows that business ex-
penditures on plant and equipment (I) are more closely correlated with
investment orders and contracts (OC) than with appropriations (App).
The regressions use lags of! of one to three quarters (see lines 1 e and
if and 3a—3c in the table). The best result for the orders-contracts se-
ries was obtained with a two-quarter lag of!. In this relationship (Table
9-1, line if), where the data are expressed in billions of dollars,
i =11.1+ 1.48 0C1_2 + u1.
Aboutseven-eighths of the variance of the investment expenditures are
statistically explained (f2= .871) and the standard error of estimate
(SE) is $1.3 billion. The best result for appropriations (Table 9-1, line
3c) was obtained with a three-quarter lag of 1:
=20.3+ 1.S7App1_3 + Vt.
Buthere ?2issmaller (.7 86) and SE is higher ($2.5 billion). Note also
that the intercept in (3c) is more than 80 per cent larger than the inter-
cept in (if).2°
Regressions based on the new data for 1953—65 yield results con-
sistent with the above. Close correlations exist between expenditures
on plant and equipment and prior values of new investment orders and
contracts, and it matters relatively little whetherOC orOC' and whether
I orare used (the distinctions between these series were discussed
earlier; see Chart 9-2 and text). Again, higher correlations are ob-
tained with a two-quarter lag of expenditures than with a one-quarter
26In these equations, gross appropriations seasonally adjusted directly by the NICB were used,
rather than the net appropriations series with the NBER adjustment (the latter is plotted as curve
2 in Chart 9-4). In later work, however, regressions with the net appropriations series were com-
puted, and the results were not improved. In fact, the determination coefficient for the relation be-
tweenand (net) is (.742)2 = .55 I, i.e., significantly lower than for the corresponding relation
with gross appropriations (3c in Table 9-1).Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment433
Table 9-1
Simple Correlations of Plant and Equipment Expenditures on Each of
Three Symptomatic Variables, 1949—61 and 1954—61
Lag of I Stand.
Relative Error
to md. of Est.
md. Var. Corr. with Plant Var. (qrs.)r ?2 (bill. dol.)Period8
and Equip. Expend. (I) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1.NEW INVESTMENT ORDERS ANDCONTRACTS (OC)
a. 0 .776 .594 3.3 1949—61
b. 1 .870 .752 2.5 1949—61
c. 2 .918 .843 2.1 1949—61
d. 3 .910 .824 2.1 1949—61
e. 1 .868 .745 1.8 1954—61
f• 2 .936 .871 1.3 1954—61
g. 3 .924 .849 1.4 1954—61
2.FIRST ANTICIPATIONS OF PLANT
AND EQUIPMENT EXPENDI-
TURES(A1) b •979 .957 LI 1949—61
3.NEW CAPITAL APPROPRIATiONS,MANUFACTURING(App)
a. 1 .686 .454 2.7 1954—61
b. 2 .850 .714 1.9 1954—61
c. 3 .891 .786 2.5 1954—61
4.LAGGED PLANT AND EQUIP-
MENT EXPENDITURES 1 .975 .950 1.2 1949—61
Source: Variable 1, Office of Business Economics—Dodge Corporation; variables 2
and 4, OBE—Securities and Exchange Commission; variable 3, National Industrial
Conference Board.
aRegressionsfor 1949—61 are based on series of 50—52 quarterly observations; those
for 1954—61, on 33 quarterly observations.
bReleasedtwo and a half to three months before the middle of the quarter to which
they refer (see text).
or zero lag; the r coefficients betweenand OCX, OC...1, and
respectively, are .929, .958, and .971. Moreover, when all three OC
terms are included simultaneously, proves redundant.
Short-Term Anticipations of Capital Outlays
Their Nature and Predictive Value
The OBE-SEC quarterly data on capital outlays are accompanied
by data on anticipated capital outlays compiled from reports of the434The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
same sample of companies. About 4—6 weeks after the beginning of
each quarter, the firms are asked to provide figures on their plant and
equipment expenditures for the quarter just passed and on expected
expenditures for the current and succeeding quarter. Both the current-
quarter and the next-quarter expectations (called "second anticipa-
tions," A2 and "first anticipations," A1, respectively) are released in the
third month of the quarter. Thus A1 becomes available less than four
months prior to the end of the quarter to which it refers, and nearly
six months ahead of the date of release of the preliminary actual data.
The reported A2 figure, which of course utilizes more current informa-
tion, has only about half as long a lead over the date of release of the
first estimate of the actual outlay and a lead of less than one month
relative to the end of the quarter concerned.
Anticipations do not represent a "stage" of the investment process
in the sense in which this term was applied to capital appropriations,
contracts and orders, and outlays. They are not a measure of early
planning of investment expenditures that is to be followed by the above
operational stages. Investment projects typically take much more time
to gestate than the three or (at most) six months that separate the dates
when anticipations are collected and the end of the period to which
they refer. These figures, therefore, express not planned but expected
expenditures. More specifically, they imply forecasts of how the out-
lays, which typically will have already been determined by previous
appropriations and orders or contracts, would be allocated between the
current and next quarters and the further future.
The forecasters are in this case highly qualified, since they represent
the companies that incur the outlays. Coming from this source, and at
a rather late point in the time scale of the investment process, when
pertinent information should already be ample, the anticipations data
promise to serve as a useful tool for forecasting plant and equipment
outlays. However, the distribution over time of investment expendi-
tures depends in part on the progress of the work underway, and hence
must be related to the developments on the supply as well as on the
demand side, including such factors as changes in prices and availa-
bility of capital goods. These considerations suggest that the relation
between anticipated and actual investment may be subject to influences
of major analytical interest.
A series made up of anticipated expenditures levels alone cannotIndicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 435
be taken to show at what points of time the actual expenditures were
expected to experience upturns or downturns. Such a series would
show changes from a previously anticipated level to the next antici-
pated level, whereas, in fact, at any given time the anticipated change
is from the latest available estimate of the actual level to the next an-
ticipated level. To take this into account and, at the same time, to avoid
the difficulties due to revisions of the expenditure series, the follow-
ing mode of presenting the anticipations was adopted in Chart 9-4: (1)
The anticipated change in expenditures between the current quarter
(t) and the next quarter (t + 1) is computed as the algebraic difference
= — The base is the second anticipation rather than
the actual outlay for the period t, because the latter figure is still un-
available when the first anticipation for t + 1 is made. (2) The antici-
pated change is added to the present version of the actual expenditures
series (Ii) to obtain the levels of first anticipations, adjusted for the ef-
fects of the revisions in the basic data:= + (3) Points rep-
resenting the levels ofare plotted in Chart 9-4 to the common scale
with the actual business outlays on plant and equipment, that is, along
with the series Ig (curve 3). The points do not form a continuous series,
but rather each is linked with the value of I in the preceding quarter.
Thus the vertical differences between the points and the curve indicate
the level errors of the adjusted first anticipations, and the differences
between the slopes of the links and of the curve indicate the change
errors (all in relative terms, since the chart uses vertical logarithmic
scales).
This presentation puts the anticipations in a better light than would
others of a more ex-ante character, for several reasons. First, revised
actual data are used in a way implying elimination of those errors of
measurement that are assumed to be corrected by the revisions. Sec-
ond, the anticipations figures have been adjusted for seasonal variation.
The official adjustment starts in the second half of 1952, but I have
carried it back to the beginning of the anticipations series. Third, the
anticipations figures have also been adjusted for the bias of underes-
timating, on the average, the changes in actual expenditures. Again,
the bias adjustment by the source goes back to 1953 only, but I have
carried it back through the earlier years covered by the data.
The improved processing of the reported figures since August 1952
caused a marked reduction in the aggregate anticipation errors. In par-436The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
ticular, the correction for seasonal variations resulted in a decisive im-
provement.27 Even after the adjustments, however, relatively large
dispersion and errors are found in the anticipations figures for individ-
ual industries. Individual-company deviations from planned investment
are often very substantial, but they tend to cancel out in industry pro-
jections; and, similarly, the errors in the latter tend to cancel out in the
record for all industries combined.28
This may seem disappointing. It is easy to think of some factors that
should enhance the predictive value of short-term investment antici-
pations. Certain projects involving outlays on plant and equipment are
"autonomous" in the sense of being very little affected by current con-
siderations. When such projects reach the point of being included in
the anticipated outlay reports for the next quarter, one would assume
them to be largely independent of such momentary fluctuations as may
then be occurring in sales, profits, interest rates, etc. The influence of
current changes in the business situation would be significant here only
on those occasions where a current development causes the firm to
revise the long-range expectations governing the given investment proj-
ect. Another consideration that favors the projectability of investment
by the firm is that capital outlays, unlike sales or profits, are to a large
extent controllable. The rate at which the expenditures are made de-
pends substantially on the firm's past planning and decisions. However,
these arguments should not be pushed too hard. Plant and equipment
outlays, viewed over short spans of time, are autonomous and control-
lable only in a limited sense and degree.
To the extent that bias is absent or effectively eliminated by data
processing, it is certainly reasonable to expect that the larger the sample
Before the correction, the anticipated changes in expenditures (A1) averaged —3.1 per cent and
the actual changes + 1.2 per cent in the period 1953—58, yielding a bias of—4.3 per cent per quarter.
After the correction, the mean relative changes were only 0.7 for first anticipations and 0.5 per cent
for actual expenditures, which gives a bias of merely 0.2 per cent. As a result of both the regular
seasonal adjustment and a separate residual bias correction, the directional errors of the anticipa-
tions of change and the dispersion of the anticipated about the actual changes were also drastically
reduced. See "An Appraisal of OBE-SEC Estimates of Plant and Equipment Expenditures, 1947—
1958," Star isticol Evaluation Reports, Report No. 1, Office of Statistical Standards, Bureau of the
Budget, October 1959, p. 40. This report was prepared by Raymond Nassimbene and Benjamin T.
Teeter.
2H Ibid., Part IV, pp. 46 if. Analyses of individual-company anticipations for selected years are
given in Irwin Friend and Jean Bronfenbrenner, "Plant and Equipment Programs and Their Realiza-
tions," in Short-Term Economic Forecasting, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 17, Princeton for
NBER, 1955, pp. 65—68; and also in articles by Murray F. Foss and Vito Natrella,Survey of Cur-
rent Business, January and March 1957.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment437
the smaller will be the error of the aggregate. This explains in part the
better showing of the all-industry anticipations in comparison to the
individual-industry figures. But the collection of companies and invest-
ment projects covered by the anticipations aggregates is far from homo-
geneous, and offsetting biases among the component groups also con-
tribute to the net error-reducing effect of aggregation. While relatively
small firms tend to underpredict, the larger firms show a slight inclina-
tion to overpredict the levels of their actual capital outlays (but the
latter are on the whole significantly better predictors than the former).29
The discrepancies between anticipated and realized capital outlays
can in some periods be related to unexpected changes in prices and the
availability of capital goods. Another factor is the errors in sales an-
ticipations. Data on the latter are also collected by the SEC and the
Commerce Department. The ex-ante approach of relating the errors
of investment anticipations to the errors of sales expectations met with
considerable success. When actual sales exceed (fall short of) expec-
tations, investment plans generally are revised upward (downward) so
that actual capital expenditures exceed (fall short of) anticipations. For
example, annual data for all manufacturing show a positive correlation
of .88 between the relative sales and investment deviations in 1948—56.
This relationship, however, is much closer on the aggregate than on the
company level.30
Eisner estimated quarterly "realization functions" by regressing the
current errors of anticipations expressed as ratios (1 —A1)/A1on two
2DSee Murray F. Fossand Vito Natrella, "Business Anticipations of Capital Expenditures and
Sales," Surveyof Current Business, March 1957, p. 8; Friend and Bronfenbrenner, "Plant and
Equipment,"pp. 69—70; Robert A. Levine, "Capital Expenditure Forecasts by Individual Firms,"
inQuality and Economic Significance of Anticipations Data, pp. 36 1—62; and Murray F. Foss and
Vito Natrella, "The StructureandRealization of Business Investment Anticipations,"ibid.,pp.
391—95.
Itmay be noted that outlays for major investment projects (large percentage additions to the firm's
fixed assets) tend to be forecast more accurately than those for small projects. The former are often
slightly overstated, the latter considerably understated. The scale-of-investment factor reinforces
the size-of-firm factors but each has some independent influence.
SeeMurray F. Foss and Vito Natrella, "Investment Plans and Realizations," Surveyof Cvi rent
Business, June1957,pp.16—17. Compare also Arthur M. Okun, "The Value of Anticipations Data
in Forecasting National Product," in Qualityand Economic Significance ofAnticipations Data, pp.
439—42,and "The Predictive Value of Surveys of Business Intentions," AmericanEco,winic Re-
view. May1962, p. 222. Interestingly, sales expectations are valuable in explaining investment de-
viations even though their record in predicting actual sales is poor. Sales errors are more systematic
and investment errors are more volatile and random; so the former cancel out much less in the ag-
gregate than the latter. Hence. "sales errors may explain only a trivial portion of the investment
errors at the microeconomic level and yet explain a substantial fraction of aggregative investment
errors" (Okun, "Anticipations Data," p. 441).438The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
terms involving deviations for anticipations of and on lagged rel-
ative changes in sales, in profits after taxes, and in unfilled orders for
machinery.31 In most cases, the resulting coefficients show the expected
signs (positive for all the relative change variables), but are generally
small relative to their standard errors, except for the terms that in-
clude the lagged values of the dependent variables. The record is ad-
mittedly "sufficiently mixed to call for careful attention to difficulties
underlying this approach and to possible modifications in its applica-
tion." 32
InvestmentAnticipations, Orders, and Expenditures
As shown above, new orders and contracts for capital goods lead
expenditures on plant and equipment consistently by substantial in-
tervals. Production of equipment or construction of plant comes be-
tween ordering or contracting and payments. There may also be ad-
ditional delays due to demand pressures and shortages on the supply
side. For first anticipations, no such built-in leading scheme exists,
other than that they are reported about one quarter earlier than the
actual outlays. Indeed, when plotted in the quarter to which they refer,
the anticipations, for optimal timing, should obviously have turning
points exactly coincident with those for actual expenditures. The pur-
pose of this index of investment intentions is not to give an interme-
diate-range prediction of turns in expenditures, but to forecast the lev-
els of expenditures over a short range.
Chart 9-4 shows that the agreement in sign between the actual in-
vestment outlays and the corresponding first anticipations was indeed
"Realizationof Investment Anticipations," in J. S. Duesenberry, 0. Fromm, L. R. Klein, and
E. Kuh, eds,, TueBrookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States, Chicago-Amster-
dam, 1965, pp. 95—128.
32ibid., p.128. For a critique and countercritique, see also Zvi Griliches, "The Brookings Model
Volume: A Review Article," Reviewof Economics and Statistics, May1968, pp.217-.18; and Gary
Fromrnarid Lawrence R. Klein, "'The Brookings Model Volume: A Review Article:' A Comment,"
ibid.,pp.236—37.
It should be noted that Eisner earlier adopted a different, stepwise approach to the same general
problem, by separately relating (I) the actual investment expenditures and (2) the anticipated in-
vestment expenditures to a common group of causal variables (several lagged sales changes, profits,
and depreciation), then (3) making the actual values depend on the same variables plus the anticipa-
tions. See R. Eisner, "Investment: Fact and Fancy,"AmericanEconomic Review, May1963, pp.
237—46. in this and related papers ("A Distributed Lag Function," Econometrica,January1960,
pp. 1—29; "Capital Expenditures, Profits, and the Acceleration Principle," in Modelsof Income
Determination,Studiesin Income and Wealth, Vol. 28, Princeton for NBER, 1964, pp. 137—65),
Eisner used data from the annual McGraw-Hill surveys of capital expenditures instituted in 1954.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 439
very good (compare the slopes of curve 3 and of the attached projec-
tions in each successive quarter). A few directional errors (divergent
slopes) did, of course, occur. At the seven major cyclical turns in ex-
penditures, two such errors can be spotted. Realized investment reached
a trough in the last quarter of 1949, but the anticipated change from
that quarter to the next was negative. Again, actual outlays show a
peak in 11-1960, but the anticipated change at the mid-year was still
positive. However, it should be noted that it takes only slight differ-
ences in levels to produce such timing discrepancies.
Quarterly percentage changes in first anticipations, computed as
— are plotted in Chart 9-5 along with the cor-
responding changes in actual plant and equipment outlays and in new
investment orders and contracts.33 The use of first differences, which
reduces sharply the influence of common trends, provides a strong test
for the short movements in the series and their possible association.
The erratic elements are emphasized but the cyclical ones, if sufficiently
valid to begin with, will not be suppressed. They are well in evidence
in each of the series here considered.
It is evident that the changes in orders-contracts are often consider-
ably larger than those in expenditures. They are also more erratic and
show more frequent sign reversals. Due to the adjustments noted be-
fore, there is little difference in the average size between the actual
and the anticipated expenditure changes (but underestimation is still
more frequent than overestimation).
Chart 9-5 gives additional evidence of the early timing of the orders-
contracts series relative to investment expenditures. The leads relating
to the aggregates themselves are shown here by the sequence of base-
line crossings, which mark the transition from positive to negative
changes, or vice versa. The turning points in the plotted quarterly rates
of change (which, of course, correspond to the inflection points in the
level series) typically follow the same sequence. Either type of meas-
urement suggests that on the average expenditures lag behind orders
by some 6 to 7 months.
A similar chart appears in my article in Moore, ed., BusinessCycle indicators,Vol. 1, p. 478,
but the relative changes in first anticipations shown there for 1953—59 were computed differently.
The figures used here are the correct ones in that they allow for the rate of second anticipations and
for all available adjustments of the data.440The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
Chart 9-5
Quarter-to-quarterPercentage Change in Investment Orders and
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Note:Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles. Circles identify the timing of
the turns in the corresponding aggregates (see Chart 9-4).
Source: See Chart 9-4.
aAnticipatedchanges are differences between the first anticipations for quarter t+ 1
and the second anticipations for the current quarter (0. They are plotted in the center
of the second quarter (1 + 1). The anticipations data have been seasonally adjusted by
the source since 1953; for earlier years, they were adjusted by means of the average
seasonal factors for 1953—58.
Chart 9-5alsoconfirms the essential agreement in sign between an-
ticipated and the actual capital outlay changes reLating to the same time
periods. Except in a few quarters, both curves representing these
changes lie either in the positive or in the negative region (above orC,
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below these base lines, respectively). This can be interpreted as mean-
ing that the two variables are basically synchronous.
There is much less agreement in size between the expected and the
realized changes. The local maxima and minima of the two curves fall
in most instances into different quarters, but without any systematic
lags of either variable; consequently, the patterns involved are on the
whole roughly coincident.34
The investment-orders estimates can be constructed with a lag of
I to 2 months. Assume they predicted correctly the turn of investment
expenditures with a lead of six months, as they did on several recent
occasions. Then their net effective forecasting lead would be about four
to five months to the middle of the quarter in which the turn occurred
(defining the net lead as the measured lead minus the publication lag).
Now the first anticipations figures are released about two months be-
fore the middle of the quarter to which they refer, and their expected
timing relative to actual expenditures is coincident; thus two months
is the net effective lead with which they can correctly predict a turn
in expenditures. It follows that the lead of orders is two to three months
longer than the lead of anticipations. This advantage of earlier signals
offsets, in some degree, the advantage of greater predictive reliability
held by the anticipations figures. Investment orders would probably
yield more false leads (signals of turns that do not materialize) than
would anticipations. As so often happens, the price of earlier forecasts
is their larger average error.
A correlation analysis leads to the same general conclusion (see
Table 9-1, line 2). Not surprisingly, first anticipations (A1) are closely
correlated with the investment expenditures (I) to which they directly
refer. Over the period 1949—61 (series of 50 quarterly observations),
correlating! and A1 results in r2(.979)2= .958,with a standard error
of estimate of $1.1 billion. This is significantly better than the highest
correlation between the OBE-Dodge investment orders and contracts
(OC) and 1, which is obtained for OC taken with a lead of two quarters
(Table 9-1, line ic): here r2= (.918)2= .843 and SE= $2.1 billion.
However, OC taken with a three-quarter lead is still almost as good a
predictor of! as is OC taken with a two-quarter lead, judging from the
Although itis difficult to identify the "turning points" in the anticipated changes, a close com-
parisonof the two curves in Chart 9-5showsa perceptible similarity between their longer fluctua-
tions, which is probablyall onecould reasonably hope for.442The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
correlation measures alone (Table 9-1, lines 1 c and 1 d). The net effec-
tive lead for this relation betweenand is 7 to 8 months, which
is more than three times that for the relation between I and A1. Again
one finds that for earlier availability of forecast OC is preferable to A1,
while for greater reliability of forecast A1 is preferable.35
Distributed Lags of Expenditures
Regressions on Several Lagged Values of Commitments
Replications of the work done with the older data for 1949—61 were
performed on the currently available quarterly series for 1953—65: the
new Census-Dodge data for fixed-investment orders and contracts and
the OBE-SEC or Commerce (National Income Division) data on ex-
penditures for plant and equipment. These calculations confirm that
the highest correlations betweenand (or betweenand
are obtained with two-quarter lags of expenditures (i =2).Three-
quarter lags give somewhat lower r's, and one-quarter and four-quarter
lags rank third and fourth in this respect. All these correlations are
high, usually exceeding the correlations obtained with the older data
for 1949—61.
There is an indication that the association between outlays and com-
mitments is closer and that it involves shorter lags for producer durable
equipment than for the structures component of GNP. In the former
case, correlation between and is maximized when i1;
in the latter, correlation between and is maximized when
i =2.However, the second-highest r's are just a little lower; in each
case, because of high autocorrelations in the time series, the results
associated with the different lags fall into relatively narrow ranges.3°
Compare Okun, "Predictive Value of Surveys," pp. 221—24. For 48 quarters from 1949-111
to 1961-11, Okun obtained results similar to mine by regressing! on A1.Hereports that A1explained
nearly 97 per cent of the variance of predicted quarterly outlays and yielded a standard error of
$0.95 billion (at annual rates). He comments on the relation between the ORE-Dodge investment
orders and contracts series (here denoted OC)andthe plant and equipment expenditures one (I),
laggedby one to three quarters, saying that OCtakenalone "does not nearly match the first antici-
pations series; taken with anticipations, [it] does not add significantly to the accuracy of the explana-
tion" (p. 224). However, Okun does not present his numerical results on this point, does not allow
for the length of the lead involved, and does not mention the trade-off between the gain in timeliness
and the loss in accuracy.
36When the lag i is varied from zero to four quarters, the following values of r are obtained: (1)
for I, vs. .925 to .970; (2) forvs. .920 to .961; (3) for vs. .886 to .963;
and (4) for Str vs. .812 to .844. The correlations with are slightly lower than those with
OC,apparentlybecause of the larger weight of structures in the former.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 443
When included along with the values of OC for each of the two pre-
ceding quarters, the current value (OCt) has no significant influence
uponalso then has a much stronger effect than In-
deed, it seems reasonable to assume that some minimum gestation pe-
riods prevail so that the shortest-lag terms of OC have no significant
effects of their own, although this assumption could well result in some
error. In other words, the distributed-lag influence onof starts
essentially with i =2and extends to larger lags (i> 2).38Forthe equip-
ment component of fixed investment, however, the one-quarter lag
term, will also be included.
In Table 9-2, investment expenditures in the period t are related to
commitments in periods t—j, t—j— 1, and t—j—2, wherej is the
lag that maximizes the simple correlation between expenditures and
commitments. The best results for total fixed-investment outlays by
business are obtained with lags of two and three quarters, that is, with
two terms, and The addition of the four-quarter lag term
fails to improve the fit in any significant manner. Application of the
reweighted orders-contracts series, OCr, yields again very similar,
though slightly lower, correlations (see lines 1—3 and 4—6).
When the longer lags in commitments are included in the separate
equations for the equipment component, more systematic improve-
ments are observed. Here j= 1and the addition of two- and three-
quarter lag terms results in higher k2'S and lower SE's although the
gains are small (lines 7—9). Larger relative improvements are achieved
in the regressions for the plant component, where j= 2and the three-
as well as four-quarter lag terms are also definitely significant (lines
10—12). Again, however, the correlations for plant (structures) are ap-
preciably lower than those for equipment (which in turn are slightly
lower than those for total fixed investment). The Durbin-Watson sta-
tistics are low throughout in Table 9-2, indicating positive autocorre-
Consider the regressions
1t3.147 — + .9790C1_1 + + = 945
(1.155) (.420)(.591) (0.435)
and
3.146 + + + Vt;R2=.946
(1.143) (.410) (0.430)
Regressionsbased on earlier data for 1949—61 also support this hypothesis. According to Table
9-I, and represent the choice of best simple leads relative toUsing both terms,
(lt)est =9.19+ .831 OC..2 + = .859;SE =$1.97billion.
(.224) (.217)444The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
Table 9-2
Regressions of Business Expenditures on Plant, Equipment, and


















(8) (2) (3) (4)
REGRESSIONS FOR EXPENDITURES ON PLANT AND EQUIPMENT
oc1_2
1. 3.215 3.243 .939 1.6950.924
(0.120) (1.247)
2. 2.010 1.304 2.407 .948 1.5570.421
(0.406)(0.423) (1.178)
3. 2.009 1.179 .138 2.311 .947k'1.5730.428
(0.410)(1.576) (.424) (1.225)
4. 7.288 2.917 .921 1.925 1.539
(0.311) (1.443)
5. It 4.218 3.427 1.521 .946 1.5960.712
(0.704)(0.731) (1.233)
6. 3.926 2.820 .995 1.168 .947 1.5830.650
(0.733)(0.862) (.762) (1.252)
REGRESSIONS FOR EXPENDITURES ON EQUIPMENT
7. 3.565 —0.244 .926 1.8260.651
(0.147) (1.285)
8. 2.137 1.528 —0.880 .935 1.7100.412
(0.541)(0.560) (1.226)
9. 2.226 0.502 1.017 —1.446 .939 1.661 0.432
(0.528)(0.763)(0.531) (1.227)
REGRESSIONS FOR EXPENDITURES ON PLANT
PC1.-3 PC1...4
10. 6.780 5.857 .706 1.621 1.277
(0.635) (1.169)
11. 4.348 3.588 3.874 .804 1.3240.876
(0.718)(0.733) (1.037)
12. Sir1 3.334 2.384 2.808 2.938 .857 1.1300.905
(0.659)(0.688)(0.667) (0.913)Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment445
Notes to Table 9-2
aAsin the text,Idenotes business capital outlays (OBE-SEC); PDE, expenditures for
producer durable equipment; Str,expendituresfor plant or nonresidential structures.
Time subscripts,here aselsewhere, refer to quarters. All the variables areinquarterly
totals at annual rates, in billions of dollars.
bEOdenotes new orders for machinery and equipment (Census); PC, contracts for in-
dustrial and commercial construction (Dodge); OC, estimated total fixed-investment
commitments (sumof EQ and PC). In lines4,5, and6, the reweighted orders-contracts
series, ocrisused, with thetimingsubscriptscorrespondingto those of OCinlines
1,2, and 3.These variables are expressed in quarterly totalsatquarterly rates, in bil-
lions of dollars.Standard errors of the regression coefficients are given underneath in
parentheses.
Standard errorsof the constanttermsare givenunderneath inparentheses.
lationof the residuals, and are not improved by the addition of longer
lags (column 9).
Estimates of average lags can be obtained by multiplying the lags i
by the corresponding regression coefficient and adding the products.
Here, however, each coefficient must first be divided by 4, because the
investment expenditure data used in the regressions are at annual rates,
while the investment commitments data are at quarterly rates. The cal-
culations yield average lags of about 2 to 2.5 quarters for the equations
relating to total fixed investment and to equipment (lines 2, 8, and 9)
and of about 5 to 6 quarters for the equations relating to plant (lines
11 and 12). In the light of other evidence to be discussed, these are in
all likelihood substantial underestimates, and the presumed reason for
this is that the method admits only two or at most three significant
terms because of multicollinearity. Each additional term with a positive
coefficient makes for an increase in the estimated average lag.
Chart 9-6 compares the estimates of total business capital outlays
based on the regression that includes 0C1_2and (Table9-2, line
2) with actual outlays. The fit is fairly good in that the estimated series
has no systematic lead or lag relative to the actuals. Significant under-
estimation errors, however, can be seen at the 1954—55 trough and
again at the end of the sample period in 1965, while overestimates pre-
vail between mid-1959 and mid-1963. At other times, including the
turning points of 1957—58, the estimated and observed values show a
close agreement.
The lower part of Chart 9-6 presents a corresponding comparison446The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
Chart 9-6
Regression Estimates for Business Equipment Expenditures and
Total Fixed Investment Outlays, Based on Two Lagged
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for equipment expenditures estimated from lagged orders, and
(Table 9-2, line 8). Here again there are no persistent timing
differences between the estimates and the actual values, but there are
substantial underestimates at the trough of 1954 and in 1964—65 and
overestimates before the peaks of 1957 and 1960.
Variable Lag Coefficients
The argument developed in Chapter 5 in favor of variable, rather
than fixed, lag coefficients in functions expressing the dependence of
shipments on new orders applies, mutatis mutandis, also to the rela-
tions between investment commitments and expenditures. The method
of allowing for the variability of the coefficients by making them depend
on the backlog-shipment ratios, U/S, worked rather well in the analysis
of the orders-shipments (N-S) relations, where matching data on N,
S, and U was available. Its application to the investment functions now
under study, however, is severely impeded because the data on hand
at best permit only a crude approximation to the U/S ratios that are
needed. Ratios can be constructed from series for the machinery and
equipment industries, but no usable backlog statistics could be found
for the plant component of business fixed investment. Furthermore, the
method involves only two lagged terms in orders or commitments (say,
for the periods t —2and t —3),permitting the relative influence of the
more distant term to rise when U/S, as a proxy for capacity utilization,
increases. This limitation to shifts between two lag coefficients or
weights is probably more detrimental here, where the lags are longer
and more complex, than it was in the case of the simpler N-S relations.
Applied to total fixed investment, the variable-lag equation is
it= ajt(OC)i_j+ + vt, (1)
where, ai.t + and=13z— + f31(U/S)1_3_1]. The
form actually used for is
=a+ + + /32(OC)(....j_1 + (2)
The estimates for bothandturned out to be smaller than their
standard errors. Better results were obtained in the separate regres-
sions for equipment and for plant, which are, respectively:
These formulations are analogous to equations 10—14 in Chapter 5.448The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
(PDEt)est =0.883+ —
(1.208) (4.252) (1.075)
+ 3.655(EO)1_2; .937;SE= 1.685; d= .546;
(0.140)
and
(Strt)est =4.061+ 13.49 —
(1.026)(5.753) (1.538)
+ 7.843(PC)1_3; R2.810; SE =1.301;d= 1.063.
(0.564)
In each case, the estimates of a1 and a2 at the mean values of the
U/S ratios come quite close to the values of the corresponding coeffi-
cients in the fixed-lag equations, as reported in Table 1-lence,
approximately the same average lags are implied by both types of re-
gressions, as should be expected. The backlog-shipment ratios for ma-
chinery and equipment came close to the high value of 6 early in 1953,
but varied between 3 and 5 in the years 1954—66 (see Chart 6-6). Ac-
cording to the model, a1 would be going from about 1 toward zero and
a2 would be going in exactly the opposite direction, as the U/S ratio
in the equation for equipment increased from 3 to 6. Hence the implied
lag for investment in equipment at U/S =6would be twice the lag at
U/S=3.
Geometric and Second-Order Lag Distributions
The model examined next is a form of geometric lag distribution
which implicitly includes all lags equal toj and more quarters and ex-
cludes the lags shorter than I.Forexample, using the symbols for total
business investment in plant and equipment, the equation reads
=k + + + Ut, (3)
40These estimatesare computed from the formulas=+ and — [13o +




In vestment Equip- Equip- Equip- Equip-
Commitments ment ment Plant men: ment Plant
Fori—f .506 .567 1.005 .503 .534 1.087
Fort—f— 1 .321 .365 0.982 .326 .382 0.897Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment449
where U1issupposed to have the usual assumed properties of the ran-
dom disturbance. This form will be recognized as a variant of the fa-
miliar Koyck distributed-lag transformation. The results of its appli-
cation are presented in Table 9-3, odd lines.
•The regression coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, that is,
of or PDE1_1 or Str1_1, are all highly significant (column 4). This,
to be sure, could merely reflect the fact that investment expenditures,
like most comprehensive economic aggregates, show a substantial de-
gree of autocorrelation. But the investment commitments variables —
0C1_2,E01_1, and —retainin each case a strong effect upon
expenditures having coefficients that are comfortably large relative to
their standard errors (column 3). The regression constants do not ap-
pear to differ significantly from zero, except perhaps in the case of
equipment (column 6). The values of R2 are appreciably higher and
those of SE appreciably lower than the best corresponding figures in
Table 9-2 (columns 7 and 8). The improvement here is particularly
substantial for the estimates of investment in structures. On the other
hand, the Durbin-Watson statistics are still mostly low in these equa-
tions, even though they are typically biased upward in such autore-
gressive forms (column 9).
The estimates listed on the even lines of Table 9-3 represent second-
order lag distributions that use two autoregressive terms. For example,
the equation for total business outlays on fixed investment contains
11—2inaddition to the factors included in (3), to read:
1= k' + b'11_1 + c'11_2 + u. (4)
The coefficients of 11—2arenegative, and so is the coefficient of the
corresponding term PDE1_2 in the regression for outlays on equipment;
but the contribution of S1r1_2 in the equation for expenditures on plant
is effectively zero (column 5). Where the second lagged dependent var-
iable turns out to be significant, its inclusion results in reductions of the
coefficients of investment commitments and increases of the coefficients
of the first autoregressive term,or PDE1_1 (compare lines 2, 4, and
6 with lines 1, 3, and 5, respectively). The values of
2areincreased
but slightly, while the standard errors of estimate are of course re-
duced; the values of d, the Durbin-Watson ratios, are raised consid-
erably.
Most of the estimates in Table 9-3 seem quite respectable by con-450The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
Table 9-3
Regressions of Fixed-Investment Expenditures on Commitments,
Based on Alternative Assumptions of Geometric and Second-Order
Distributed Lags, Quarterly, 1953—65
Invest- Regression Coefficients
ment
Corn- Lagged Dependent Stand.
Dur-
bin-
mit- Invest- Variableb Error
ments ment Con- of Est.




Lineable ments a — I—2 Term R2 dot.) tistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
REGRESSIONS FOR EXPENDITURES ON PLANT AND EQUIPMENT (1k)
I 1.154 0.706 —.772 .977 1.0440.961
(0.247)(0.081) (.895)
20C1_20.786 1.291 —.518 .312 .9830.890 1.498
(0.228)(0.155) (.122) (.805)
30Cj.2 2.075 0.784 —1.219 .973 1.121 1.068
(0.576)(0.082) (.946)
4 1.416 1.402 —.581 .179 .9820.921 1.659
(0.493) (0.146) (.123) (.830)
REGRESSIONS FOR EXPENDITURES ON EQUIPMENT (PDE1)
5 0.991 0.775 —1.250 .9820.891 1.363
(0.223)(0.064) (.633)
6 0.870 1.026 —.235 —.818 .983 0.872 1.740
(0.229)(0.157) (.134) (.666)
REGRESSIONS FOR EXPENDITURES ON PLANT (Str1)
7 .988 0.942 —.469 .9640.565 1.698
(.387)(0.052) (.535)
8 .990 0.940 .003 —.470 .9630.572 1.695
(.405)(0.182) (.171) (.548)
Note: For identification of symbols, see Table 9-2, notes a and b. Standard errors of
the regression coefficients and constant terms are shown in parentheses underneath each
statistic.
8Asidentified in column 2.
bJ,PDE, or SIr, as indicated in the heading, with the subscripts t —1or t —2as indi-
cated in columns 4 and 5.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 451
ventional statistical standards. The regression coefficients are several
times larger than their standard errors and, hence, appear to be highly
significant. The values ofarevery high, too. However, a far more
difficult and sensitive test for such equations is provided by the reason-
ableness and definiteness of what they imply about the lag structure of
the investment processes.
It is helpful at this point to consider the long-run equilibrium aspects
of these If the orders-contracts series referred strictly and
exclusively to new plant and equipment and were net of cancellations
and duplications, and if expenditures covered exactly the same items
and no others, then a unit increase in orders, indefinitely maintained,
should be associated with a unit increase in expenditures. Briefly, a
permanent rise in OC of, say, $1 billion would result in an equal rise
in I. This is the case of perfect measurement, which of course cannot
be assumed. Actually, the equations for total fixed investment and for
equipment in Table 9-3, lines 1—2 and 5—6, imply that a maintained
change in commitments of one unit does induce a parallel long-run
change in expenditures of approximately one unit. For example, for the
regression on line I of the table, the estimated "total response" of I
to a persistent unit rise in OC equals 0.28851(1 —0.7055)=0.9695.
The corresponding value for the equation on line 2 is 0.1964/(1 —
1.2914+0.5177)= 0.8680.41 Similarly, estimates of 1.0996 and 1.0414
are obtained for the total long-run response of expenditures on PDE
in the equations on lines 5 and 6 on Table 9-3, respectively.
The regressions for business investment in plant, however, imply a
maintained increase of $4,290 billion in expenditures (Str). This clearly
reflects the large discrepancy in coverage between the series of non-
residential building contracts on the one hand and the series of capital
outlays on structures on the other. The equations for total plant and
equipment investment that use the reweighted orders-contracts data,
i.e., OC', also yield long-run response estimates that exceed unity. The
figures obtained here are 2.403 for the geometric and 1.979 for the sec-
ond-order lag distribution (Table 9-3, lines 3 and 4). They are at least
41Thefigure for line I equals (114)[a/(l —b)], usingthe symbols from equation (3); the figure for
line 2 equals (114)[a'/(l— b' — c')], usingthe symbols from equation (4). The formulas allow for the
use of data at quarterly and annual rates but are otherwise familiar and equivalent to those used in
Chapters 5and7, above.452TheBehavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
twice as large as they should be because the scaling-down of the equip-
ment orders component, designed to bring it into better relation with
plant contracts, also reduces the average level of OC' to less than half
that of OC.
The tabulation below lists the average lags for the investment func-
tions identified by their principal variables.42 Except in the case of
structures, investment expenditures taken with a two-quarter lead have
significant negative coefficients (Table 9-3, column 5). This implies that
the average lags calculated from the second-order functions are here
preferable to those calculated from the geometric lag distributions that,
tend to be overestimates. The second-order model suggests mean lags
of expenditures of three to four quarters for total fixed investment and






investment Function for Table 9-3 (odd lines)(even lines)
Plant and equipment (I, OC) 1, 2 4.4 3.1
Plant and equipment (1, OCT) 3, 4 5.6 3.3
Equipment (PDE, EO) 5, 6 4.4 3.7
Plant (Str, PC) 7, 8 18.4 18.4
The patterns of lagged response implied by the second-order equa-
tions can be computed by the stepwise method used before (see Table
5-6 for description and illustrations). For example, the results for the
42Theaverages are computedwith the aid of the formulasb/(1 —b) forthegeometric and (b' +
2c')/(J—— c') for the second-order lag distribution. Since the investment commitments variables
bearthe subscript: —2for total fixed-investment and plant andt —Ifor equipment, 2 and I, respec-
tively, must be added to the values calculated from the formulas. Compare the discussion of the cor-
responding measures in Chapter 5,
It will be noted that the second-order models give a longer average lag for equipment alone than
for plant and equipment combined. This is certainly unsatisfactory, since the lag for equipment
must be presumed shorter. It is generally recognized that the lags for structures are much longer
than thoseforequipment, and our results show this contrast very strongly. But let us recall that the
dependent variable in the total fixed-investment regressions is represented by the OBE-SEC busi-
ness capital outlays series (1),whichis notequalto the sum of the two dependent variables in the
separate regressions for equipment and for plant, where the C NP investment components (PDEand
Si,') are used. Hence the reported results are not internally inconsistent.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 453
equipment regression from Table 9-3,line 6, which are tabulated below,
suggest that the modal effect of equipment orders (EO)onoutlays for
producer durables (PDE) involves a lag of two quarters (the one-quar-
ter effect is a little smaller). Nearly 60 per cent of the total long-run
reaction would be accomplished within a three-quarter interval, but
seven quarters are needed to reach the 90 per cent mark.
Cumulative
Effect as
Length of Lag (i) Effect of E01_1Per Cent of











{(l/4)[a'/(l — b' — c')]} 1.041
Theestimates from the second-order equations for total business
capital outlays and equipment expenditures (Table 9-3, lines 2 and
6, respectively) are presented in Chart 9-7 for comparison with the
observed values. The fits are very good indeed and appreciably closer
than those in Chart 9-6. The estimates, however, lag slightly at some
turning points and tend to understate somewhat the actual levels on the
upgrade and overstate them somewhat on the downgrade. Such results
are frequently observed for models with lagged dependent variables.
Additional Tests and Models
To test for possible misspecification of these models, it is desirable
to include in the regressions additional lagged terms of the independent
variable (compare note 29 and text in Chapter 5, above). This proce-
dure also could conceivably result in improved estimates of the time
structure of the investment process. Thuswas related stepwise to454The Behavior of Investment Corhmitments and Expenditures
Chart 9-7
Regression Estimates for Business Equipment Expenditures and
Total Fixed Investment Outlays, Based on Second-Order
Distributed Lags, Quarterly, 1953—65
(tt)est= .312+ + 1.29
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the terms of and plusand 't2' and similarly
for the regressions that refer to the equipment and plant components
of investment separately. In each case, then, three values of the com-
mitments variable were included (for the lags j,j +1, and j+2), as
well as two lagged values of the dependent variable. Corresponding
forms are found in some recent empirical work on distributed-lag in-
vestment functions.44 The possibility of comparing these estimates with
the results of those studies was an additional motive for these experi-
ments.
The tests refute the (a priori doubtful) hypothesis that capital out-
lays are simply a function of a single term in prior investment commit-
ments with autocorrelated residuals. The addition of for ex-
ample, contributes little if anything to the regression ofon and
However, multicollinearity presents a difficult problem for the
equations considered here, as it probably does in other applications of
models that include several lagged terms in both the independent and
the dependent variables.45 The coefficients of retain values close
to those listed in Table 9-3, but the coefficients of while still neg-
ative, tend to be considerably smaller and are not always significant
by conventional standards. No gains at all result from adding the ear-
lier values of investment commitments to the separate regressions for
equipment and for plant; the coefficients of these terms are not sig-
nificant.46
In equations (3) and (4) estimated in the preceding section, is
used as an explanatory variable and should be independent of
u;but this desideratum may not be satisfied, since the assumed proc-
ess makes a weighted average of past disturbances. In one approach
for dealing with this problem, the actual value of the lagged dependent
variable is replaced (as in the section on "Instrumental Variables" in
See Dale W. Jorgenson and JamesA. Stephenson,"TheTime Structure of Investment Behavior
inUnited States Manufacturing, 1947—1960," Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1967,
pp. 16—27.
In some cases, it is difficult to verify this supposition because the necessaryinformationis lack-
ing; for example, the Jorgenson-Stephenson article fails to list the standard errors of the regression
coefficients presented there.
illustrate, the "best" of the equations of this type, that for total fixed investment using the
reweighted commitments data, reads
(Ii)est = .192 + 1.295(OCr),_2 + .765(OC'),_3 — + —.5531(2,
(.858)(0.510) (.571) (.594) (0.151) (.137)
and yields R2.982, SE =.916,and d1.448. The implied average lag is 3.3 quarters, the same
as for the second-order model with one term only (see the tabulation on page 452,above).456The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
Chapter 5) by an estimated value. In the present case, estimated
from past values of OC, as in Table 9-2, could be substituted for
Accordingly,the regression
=+ + + + (4a)
was computed for total business capital outlays, with j= 2and
2.010(OC)1_2 + as in Table 9-2, line 2. Analogously,
estimates from the equations shown on lines 8 and 11 of Table 9-2
were used to calculate regressions for and respectively.
The results thus obtained proved disappointing. The estimated
coefficients of (4a), with their standard errors in brackets, are: a*
1.994 (±0.470); b* =0.522(±0.306); and=—0.122 (±0.218). It
appears, therefore, that carries the brunt of such explanation as
is offered here, since the effect ofis relatively weak and that of
't-2 insignificant. The fit = .942,SE =1.616) is somewhat worse
than in the regression ofon and (see Table 9-2, line
2). Apparently, the estimates are not good enough for the role
assigned them in equation (4a), even though they are certainly quite
closely associated with the lagged values of the actual expenditures
they replace (see Table 9-2, column 7). Corresponding calculations
for equipment and for plant yield R2 coefficients that are somewhat
higher than their counterparts in Table 9-2 but also significantly lower
than those in Table 9-3. Such estimates of lag structure as can be de-
rived from these equations are unsatisfactory.47
Another approach assumes a specific form of serial dependence
among the disturbances, such as the simplest autoregressive scheme
= +t. Applying this to the residuals u from the regression
=a+ + +Ut(Table9-2, line 2), p is estimated
to be .6924. The relation between the transformed variables (compare
equation 21 in Chapter 5) is
It —Pit—i=a(1—p)+ —
+ — + (5)
and the least-square estimates for this equation (with standard errors)
are: a(1 —p)=—O.597 (±0.738); b= 1.900 (±0.225); and c= 1.816
4TThe coefficients of the lagged values of estimated expenditures are low, and catcutations based
on them result in implausibly short average lags [e.g., little more than three quarters for the equa-
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(±0.223). Considering the usual effects of a transition from levels to
differences, the correlation obtained is quite good = .871).The
Durbin-Watson statistic is1.394, a sharp increase from the value
observed for the level regression (d =0.421in Table 9-2, line 2). The
equation implies positive coefficients for and 0C1_3, and an
average lag of about 5.2 quarters.
Chart 9-8 compares the estimates of business fixed-investment ex-
penditures based on regression (5) with actual expenditures. The fit is
very close indeed in the period from 1955 through the first half of
1958 and in the years 1963—65. The deviations of the estimates from
the actual values are occasionally larger in the intervening period
1958—62, but even here the fit is on the whole good. The timing of
estimated expenditures coincides with that of actual expenditures at
most of the recorded turns: the peaks in 1957 and the troughs in 1958,
1961, and 1963. The behavior ofin the vicinity of its peak in the
second quarter of 1960 is not well reproduced in the estimates, which
were somewhat too low at the time but too high in the preceding and
subsequent intervals, that is, in IV-1959 and IV-1960 and 1-1961.
There is also a one-quarter lag of (!)est behind 1 at the minor peak of
/ in 1962.
Comparisons with Other Estimates
Kareken and Solow estimate by least squares the equation
=—7.330+ .3 + R2 =.9927 (KS)
(.040)(.009)
whereis the FRB index of production of business equipment (1957
=100)andis the OBE series on new orders for nonelectrical ma-
chinery, deflated by the BLS index of wholesale prices for machinery
and motive products (1947—49 =100).Both series are monthly and
seasonally adjusted and cover the period from April 1947 to April
1960.48
To approximate the period covered by Kareken and Solow, their
results are compared with a similar distributed-lag regression based
on estimated fixed-investment commitments and outlays of business
4BSee John Karekenand Robert M. Solow, "Lags in Fiscal and Monetary Policy," Research Study
One for ihe Commission on Money and Banking, in Albert Ando et aL, StabilizationPolicies,
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Chart 9-8
Regression Estimates for Business Total Fixed Investment Outlays,
Based on Transformed Variables, Quarterly, 1954—65
(It)est= .597+ —
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in 1949—6 1. Here the older data on orders must be used, which alone
are available before 1953 (as in the simple regressions of Table 9-1).
My Koyck-type equation is
=2.452+ ± R2 =.964;SE =1.03(Z)
(0.828) (.101) (.058)
Using the symbols a for the first and b for the second of the slope
coefficients, let us compute for each of these two regressions:
a(1 —b'1)/a log (1 —q)
1—b/l_b1b orn=iogb
It will be recalled from Chapters 5 and 7 that q is the proportion of the
"total effect" [a/(1 —b)]accounted for by an interval of n unit periods.
For five selected proportions, ranging from 30 to 90 per cent of the
total response of investment expenditures to a unit change in com-
mitments, the resulting lag distributions are as follows:
Value of q
n 0.3 0.50.7 0.8 0.9
For (KS) 2.6 5.08.7 11.6 16.7
For (Z) 2.2 4.3 6.0 7.3 9.6
These figures suggest a slower reaction for the Kareken-Solow equa-
tion than for my equation involving I and OC. In the first year, no
significant difference appears: for n =4,q =.425in the former case
and q =.455in the latter (where allowance is made for the initial two-
quarter lead of OC relative to 1). But widening discrepancies can be
observed in comparing the times required to absorb more than 50
per cent of the total response.
The meaning of such comparisons is, to be sure, rather uncertain,
if only because the different explorations use very different data. There
are, for example, these four sources of discrepancies between my re-
suits and those of Kareken-Solow: (1) their use of output rather than
expenditures; (2) their use of the equipment component only, excluding
plant; (3) their use of nonelectrical machinery orders only, rather than
a more comprehensive orders aggregate; and (4) their reliance on series
in "real" terms. General knowledge of the data suggests that (2) and460The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
(3) are the most important of these sources, while (4) makes probably
less of a difference and (1) perhaps still less. The OCseriesor rather
its orders component should, despite its weakness, be definitely prefer-
able to N. It is a much more comprehensive indicator of investment
orders and therefore more suitable for use in connection with invest-
ment realization for equipment, whether the latter are measured by
output or expenditures.
Kareken and Solow also estimated some distributed-lag relationships
of a higher order by including additional lagged values of the dependent
variable (B1_2and inthe regressions ofon and B,_1.This
leads from the geometrically declining to unimodal lag distributions.
The resulting lag structures are more concentrated; e.g., within the
span of five quarters, one half of the total response is accounted for
when only one lagged term is used, but with two terins the proportion
rises to 56 per cent, and with three terms to 65 per cent. Shifts in the
same direction are implied by my estimates in Table 9-3.
The relation between new capital appropriations and investment
expenditures has recently been estimated for total manufacturing and
seventeen subdivisions by Shirley Almon.49 This study, based on the
NICB large-company data for 1953—61, presents a new method of
estimating distributed lags that employs polynomial interpolations
between a few points obtained from regressions. Almon selects an
eight-quarter lag distribution for "all manufacturing" as yielding the
best fit and the most stable weights. The proportions of appropriations
spent, according to this model, are 15 per cent within the first half year,
45 per cent in a year, 77 per cent during the first six quarters, and 92
percent by the end of two years. The distribution is roughly symmetric,
with the half-way point in spending being reached just after the fourth
quarter.
The geometric and second-order models used previously yield, of
course, highly skewed lag distributions that tail off slowly in an asymp-
totic fashion in the direction of long lags; this is quite unlike Almon's
diversified but in general much more symmetrical patterns, with finite
numbers of periods (mostly seven to nine quarters) in each distribution.
The choice of the model of the lag distribution usually has to be made
on empirical rather than theoretical grounds, and the statistical results
"The Distributed Lag Between Capital Appropriationsand Expenditures,"Economeirica,
January 1965, pp.178—96.Indicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment461
as well as criteria are far from clear-cut. Hence, in practice, lag struc-
tures are commonly estimated by some more or less arbitrary and
intuitive procedures, used partly because of computational coriven-
ience. Relatively small differences in the calculated regression coeffi-
cients can result in large differences between the associated lag
patterns.50 Consequently, it is very difficult to establish such patterns
with any substantial precision. The more modest objective of estimat-
ing the average and perhaps also the variance of a lag distribution
has a much greater chance of being reasonably well attained. Different
models that inevitably yield very divergent lag patterns may well be
in essential agreement on the length of the average lag. Thus the
average lags of three to five quarters reported for the investment func-
tions in the two preceding sections are approximately consistent with
the average lag of somewhat more than four quarters that is implied
by the all-manufacturing equation of Almon.5'
Other equations for investment in plant and equipment that were
examined employ "causal" variables, such as sales, profits, capital
stock, and interest rates, either alone or in combination with "symp-
tomatic" variables, such as appropriations, commitments, and antici-
pations. The lag patterns suggested by such functions are discussed
and compared in the next chapter.
Summary
Series on new investment commitments—capital appropriations,
orders, and contracts—reflect the change in the demand for services
of capital goods that is embodied in the "investment decision." On the
other hand, business expenditures on plant and equipment are typically
concentrated in later stages of the investment process and also depend
on the developments on the supply side—along with production, de-
liveries, and installations. A hypothesis that assigns to investment the
major causal role in business cycles does not require that capital out-
lays lead aggregate production and income (actually, they tend to lag),
but it presumably does require, among other conditions, that invest-
ment commitments lead, which they do.
50SeeZvi Griliches, "Distributed Lags: A Survey," Econometrica, January1967,pp. 29—3 1.
If the contracting stage is thought of as following upon the appropriations stage, the lags using
appropriations ought to be the longer ones, but the differences on this account may not be large
(also, orders may sometimes precede appropriations).462The Behavior of Investment Commitments and Expenditures
Estimates of aggregate investment commitments can be obtained by
adding the value of new orders received by industries mainly producing
machinery and equipment to the value of new contracts for industrial
and commercial construction. The resulting series (OC)hasvarious
shortcomings —most.particularly, its equipment component is too large
relative to its plant component—but this appears to affect chiefly the
level of, not the relative changes in, these data. The time-path of busi-
ness capital expenditures (1) resembles the course of new investment
orders and contracts, but the fluctuations in I lag behind those in OC
and have smaller percentage amplitudes. Most of the lags recorded at
the cyclical turning points in these series are two- or three-quarter lags.
New capital appropriations of large manufacturing corporations
(App) are roughly coincident with OC. The highest simple correlations
with I are observed when App is taken with a lead of three quarters
relative to I (r= .89)and when OC is taken with a lead of two quarters
(r=.94).
The so-called first anticipations of plant and equipment expenditures
(Ashowa higher correlation with actual expenditures (I) than any
other investment indicator. The close association between the two
series is not surprising, since they have the same source and coverage
and, importantly, since A1 predicts I in the next quarter, that is, with a
very short lead. Investment products typically take more time to ges-
tate; consequently, the quarterly anticipations express not planned but
expected expenditures. In other words, at this late stage, outlays are
already largely known from previous commitments; remaining to be
"anticipated" is how they will be allocated between the current and
next quarters and the further future. The commitments series OC and
App, when taken with subscripts (t— 3),have effective forecasting
leads relative tothat are much longer than the lead of AThese
series can give early signals of turning points in expenditures, while
anticipations can only give current recognition of these turning points.
The estimates of business capital outlays improve when distributed
lags are used. For example, whenis regressed on and
the calculated series coincides with the actual one at turning points
and, on the whole, the observed discrepancies are not large. Autocor-
related disturbances present a problem, but this can be handled rather
well by using modified first differences of the variables. Higher
correlations are obtained with equations that include, in addition toIndicators and Stages of Investment in Plant and Equipment 463
the selected terms in earlier commitments, the previous values of the
dependent variable, i.e., of expenditures. However, although the
residual errors are then on the whole very small, they contain system-
atic elements, as manifested in short lags of the estimates at several
turning points.
The distributed-lag regressions suggest that the average lags of I
behind OC vary between three and five quarters. At least half of the
expenditures are made within one year after commitment; two-thirds
or more, within the first six quarters. There are some indications sup-
porting the hypothesis that the lags vary directly with the degree of
capacity utilization in the capital-goods-producing industries. Thus
when the coefficients in the equation for expenditures on equipment are
assumed to depend on the backlog-shipments ratio for equipment
manufacturers, rises (falls) in that ratio produce relatively large in-
creases (decreases) in the estimated lag of expenditures.